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Abstract
We extend a recently developed framework for analyzing asynchronous coordinate descent algorithms
to show that an asynchronous version of tatonnement, a fundamental price dynamic widely studied in
general equilibrium theory, converges toward a market equilibrium for Fisher markets with CES utilities
or Leontief utilities, for which tatonnement is equivalent to coordinate descent.
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1 Introduction
As is well known, it is PPAD-hard to compute equilibria for general games and markets [22, 9, 18, 8, 38, 10].
By viewing the players and the environment collectively as implicitly performing a computation, these
hardness results indicate that, in general, a game or market cannot reach an equilibrium quickly (assuming
no unexpected complexity results such as PPAD = FP). As a result, a lot of attention has been given to
the design of polynomial-time algorithms to compute equilibria, either exactly or approximately, for specific
families of games and markets. Most of these algorithms can be categorized as either simplex-like (e.g.,
Lemke-Howson [31]), numerical methods (e.g., the interior-point method [41] or the ellipsoid method [28]),
or some carefully-crafted combinatorial algorithms (e.g., flow-based algorithms for computing an equilibrium
of a market with agents having linear utility functions [23, 34, 25]).
However, it seems implausible that these algorithms describe the implicit computations in games or
markets. In particular, many markets appear to have a highly distributed environment. This would appear
to preclude computations which require centralized coordination, which is essential for the three categories
of algorithms above. Consequently, in order to justify equilibrium concepts, we want natural algorithms
which could plausibly be running (in an implicit form) in the associated distributed environments. Moreover,
since it is preferable not to assume centralized timing or coordination, a desirable feature of such natural
algorithms is robustness against asynchrony, which means such algorithms should remain effective even in
situations where information transfer takes time and agents make decisions (i.e., perform computations)
with possibly outdated information.
A first candidate for a natural algorithm in markets is tatonnement: it adjusts the price of a good upward
if there is too much demand, and downward if too little. Indeed, tatonnement was proposed alongside
the concept of a market equilibrium by Walras [39] in 1874. Since then, studies of market equilibria
and tatonnement have received much attention in economics, operations research, and most recently in
computer science; we list a small sample of the voluminous literature, focusing mainly on computer science
works [2, 37, 24, 17, 20, 21, 14, 13, 36]. Underlying many of these works is the issue of what are plausible
price adjustment mechanisms and in what types of markets they attain a market equilibrium.
The tatonnements studied in prior work have mostly been continuous, or discrete and synchronous. Cole
and Fleischer [20] observed that real-world market dynamics are highly distributed and hence presumably
asynchronous. They argued that any realistic price dynamics must involve out-of-equilibrium trade in order
to induce the imbalances leading to price updates. Further, they argued that simple rules with relatively
low information requirements were more plausible. The lowest imaginable level of information would be for
each seller to only know the demand for the good it was selling, and for any price updating to occur in
a non-coordinated manner, i.e., asynchronously. Accordingly, they introduced the Ongoing market model,
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a model of a repeating market incorporating update dynamics, and they analyzed the performance of an
asynchronous tatonnement in this market. The market also incorporated warehouses (buffers) to cope with
supply and demand imbalances.
Cheung, Cole and Devanur [13] showed that tatonnement is equivalent to coordinate descent on a convex
function for several classes of Fisher markets, and consequently that a suitable synchronous tatonnement
converges toward the market equilibrium in three general classes of markets: complementary-CES Fisher
markets1, substitute-CES Fisher markets, and Leontief Fisher markets; Cheung [11] extended this to all
nested-CES Fisher markets. In this paper, we show that this equivalence enables us to perform an amortized
analysis to show that the corresponding asynchronous version of tatonnement converges toward the market
equilibrium in these classes of markets; indeed, our analysis also covers Fisher markets in which some
buyers have substitute-CES utility functions and others have complementary ones. We also note that the
tatonnement for Leontief Fisher markets analyzed in [13] had an unnatural constraint on the step sizes; our
analysis removes that constraint.
Finally, we remark that it is by no means obvious that the existence of a convergence result for syn-
chronous updating implies an analogous result for asynchronous updating. An example of a setting where
an asynchronous result has yet to be achieved is proportional response dynamics [42, 4, 15].
Technique of Analysis, and Comparison with the Companion Paper [16]. In a companion pa-
per [16], we analyzed several versions of asynchronous coordinate descent. The analyses in both papers
follow a common framework. We use an amortized analysis which relates the actual progress to the desired
progress, where the desired progress is a constant fraction of the progress achieved with synchronous updat-
ing. The amortization is used to hide the difference between these two measures of progress by amortizing
it over multiple updates. As we shall see, this difference is bounded by the squares of appropriate excess
demand (resp. gradient) differences, and using Lipschitz gradient parameters, these can in turn be bounded
by sum of the squares of recent changes to the prices (resp. coordinates). The final ingredient is to show
that the progress is an upper bound on the square of the change to the updated price. Combining these
ingredients yields a lower bound on the rate of progress.
In [16], it was assumed that the underlying convex function has some global finite Lipschitz gradient
parameters, which is a common assumption in optimization and machine learning. The main focus there is
on the maximum possible degree of parallelism which permits linear speedup, and on a number of challenges
to devising rigorous and complete analyses which handle the subtle interplay between randomness (choices
of coordinates) and asynchrony.
However, in the asynchronous tatonnement setting we analyze here, there are no global finite Lipschitz
gradient parameters. Instead, we use local Lipschitz gradient parameters, as was done implicitly in [13];
the consequence is that the rate of convergence depends on the starting point. Also, the only acceptable
degree of parallelism is the maximal one, i.e., all sellers are adjusting prices independently in parallel. The
challenge is to devise an asynchronous analysis while keeping the price update rule reasonable, i.e., having
the step size be an absolute constant which is independent of the number of goods. This calls for a somewhat
different potential function and analysis from the one used for the asynchronous coordinate descent analysis
in [16]; the analysis also differs quite substantially from the synchronous tatonnement analyses in [13].
Relevance to Theoretical Computer Science. Iterative procedures and dynamical systems are perva-
sive across multiple disciplines; a non-exhaustive list of such systems which have interested theorists includes
bandwidth sharing (e.g., proportional response [40, 42, 15]), SDD linear system solvers [29, 30], distributed
load balancing [27, 3], bird flocking [6], influence systems [7] and the spread of information memes across
the Internet [32].
There have been many analyses of these systems, but one issue that has received relatively little attention
is the timing of agents’ actions. In most prior analyses, amenable timing schemes (e.g., synchronous or round
robin updates) and perfect information retrieval were assumed, perhaps because they were more readily
analyzed. However, typically these assumptions are unrealistic, and to better understand how these systems
really behave, it is important to obtain asynchronous analyses of such systems. We believe the insight from
our amortization framework may be useful in obtaining such analyses.
Other Related Work. In a similar spirit to our analysis, Cheung, Cole and Rastogi [14] analyzed asyn-
chronous tatonnement in certain Fisher markets. This earlier work employed a potential function which
drops continuously when there is no update and does not increase when an update is made. This approach
could be followed for the current market setting, but in the current work, we instead use a discrete analysis
1i.e., markets in which the buyers all have complementary CES utilities.
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which has more in common with our asynchronous coordinate descent analyses in [16]. Our work differs
from [14] in two aspects. First, the update rule in [14] is more restricted: they use average excess demand
for updates, while our update rule allows an arbitrary value between the maximum and minimum excess
demands. Second, while the high-level idea is similar, our potential function is substantially different from
(and more sophisticated than) the one in [14], and the classes of markets covered by the two analyses are
quite different.
In a recent work, Dvijotham et al. [26] study a different asynchronous dynamics. In their setting sellers
are boundedly rational and buyers are myopic (i.e., best responding). More specifically, the base (zero) level
for the sellers is to be best responding, and level k+1 is obtained by best responding to level k sellers. They
show that this system converges linearly to the market equilibrium in suitable Fisher markets including
substitute-CES markets.
For the closely related topic of learning dynamics in games, where updates are based on the payoffs
received by agents, again, the classical approach assumes synchronous or round-robin updates with up-to-
date payoffs; models with stochastic update schedules were also studied previously (e.g., in [5, 1, 33]), while
learning dynamics with delayed payoffs [35] were studied recently.
2 Preliminaries and Results
Fisher Market. In a Fisher market, there are n perfectly divisible goods and m buyers. Without loss
of generality, the supply of each good is normalized to be one unit. Each buyer i has a utility function
ui : Rn+ → R, and a budget of size ei. At any given price vector p ∈ Rn+, each buyer purchases a
maximum utility affordable collection of goods. More precisely, xi ∈ Rn+ is said to be a demand of buyer i
if xi ∈ arg maxx′: x′·p≤ei ui(x′).
A price vector p∗ ∈ Rn+ is called a market equilibrium if at p∗, there exists a demand xi of each buyer i
such that
p∗j > 0 ⇒
m∑
i=1
xij = 1 and p
∗
j = 0 ⇒
m∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1.
We note that in the markets we studied here, the demand at any price vector is unique. In these markets,
we let zj :=
∑m
i=1 xij − 1 denote the excess demand for good j.
CES utilities. In this paper, each buyer i’s utility function is of the form
ui(xi) =
 n∑
j=1
aij · (xij)ρi
1/ρi ,
for some −∞ ≤ ρi < 1, where each aij is a non-negative number. ui(xi) is called a Constant Elasticity of
Substitution (CES) utility function. They are a class of utility functions often used in economic analysis.
The limit as ρi → −∞ is called a Leontief utility, usually written as ui(xi) = minj xijcij 2; and the limit as
ρi → 0 is called a Cobb-Douglas utility, usually written as
∏
j xij
aij , with
∑
j aij = 1. The utilities with
ρi ≤ 0 capture goods that are complements, and those with ρi ≥ 0 goods that are substitutes. Accordingly,
when ρi ≤ 0, we say the utility function is a complementary CES utility function, and when ρi ≥ 0 we say
it is a substitute CES utility function.
Directly Related Prior Results and Our Results. Cheung, Cole and Devanur [13] showed that
tatonnement is equivalent to coordinate descent on a convex function φ for Fisher markets with buyers
having complementary-CES or Leontief utility functions (and in a later version of the paper, substitute-
CES utility functions too). To be specific, [13] showed that for the convex function
φ(p) =
n∑
k=1
pk +
m∑
i=1
ei · log uˆi(p),
where uˆi(p) is the optimal utility that buyer i attains at price vector p with a unit of spending, we have
that ∇jφ(p) = −zj(p). The corresponding update rule is
p′j ← pj · [ 1 + λ ·min{zj , 1} ] , (1)
2The utility function ui(x) = minj
xij
cij
can be seen as the limit of ui(x) =
(∑
j
(
xij
cij
)ρi ) 1ρi as ρi ↘ −∞.
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where λ > 0 is a suitable constant. As the update rule is multiplicative, they assumed that the initial prices
were positive.
As argued in [20], when the economic activity is occurring over time, it is natural to base each price
update for a good on the excess demand observed by its seller since the time of the last price update to her
good (possibly weighted toward more recent sales). This perceived excess demand can be written as the
product of the length of the time interval with an instantaneous excess demand at some specific time in this
interval, which yields the following modification of update rule (1).
p′j ← pj · [ 1 + λ ·min{z˜j , 1} · (t− αj(t)) ] , (2)
where αj(t) denotes the time of the latest update to price j strictly before time t, z˜j is a value between the
minimum and maximum instantaneous excess demands during the time interval (αj(t), t), and λ > 0 is a
suitable constant. We assume that t− αj(t) ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 0 and for all goods j.
As we will see, having λ ≤ 1/25.5 suffices. In comparison, in the synchronous version [13], λ ≤ 1/6
suffices. This implies that the step sizes of the asynchronous tatonnement can be kept at a constant fraction
of those used in its synchronous counterpart.
Theorem 1. For λ ≤ 1/25.5, asynchronous tatonnement price updates using rule (2) converge linearly
toward the market equilibrium in any complementary-CES market, and they converge in any Leontief Fisher
market.
Theorem 2. Let M be a Fisher market in which buyers have CES utility functions. Suppose that ρ :=
maxi ρi < 1 and mini ρi > −∞ in M. Let E := max {1/(1− ρ) , 1}. Then for λ ≤ 1/(26E), asynchronous
tatonnement price updates using rule (2) converge linearly toward the market equilibrium.
In the main body of the paper, we focus on the result concerning complementary-CES Fisher markets.
The analysis for Theorem 2 is just a small modification of the complementary case, and is deferred to
Appendix A. For the Leontief Fisher markets, while the first part of the analysis is identical to the com-
plementary case, this is not enough to demonstrate convergence, and to do so requires substantially more
effort; the full analysis is deferred to Appendix C.
In an earlier version of this paper [12] on arXiv, we proved Theorem 1 (except that λ was slightly larger)
using a potential function which decreases continuously over time, as was the case for the analyses in [21, 14]
also. We believe the current analysis is considerably simpler. The main advantage of the prior analysis at
this point is that we extended it to account for the warehouses in the Ongoing market model, albeit with a
quite non-trivial argument. This seems possible with the potential function in the present paper too, but
we suspect it would be of interest to at most a few specialists.
Standard Notation in Coordinate Descent. Let ej denote the unit vector along coordinate (in our
context, price) j. A function F is L-Lipschitz-smooth if for any p,∆p ∈ Rn, ‖∇F (p+∆p)−∇F (p)‖ ≤ L ·
‖∆p‖. For any coordinates j, k, a function F is Ljk-Lipschitz-smooth if for any p ∈ Rn and r ∈ R,
|∇kF (p+ r · ej)−∇kF (p)| ≤ Ljk · |r|. Also, as is standard, Lj denotes Ljj .
3 Key Ideas and Lemmas
For simplicity, we assume that at any particular time t, there is at most one update to one good. In general,
since there is no coordination between price updates of different goods, it is possible that the prices of two
goods are updated at the same moment ; but by using any arbitrary tie-breaking (perturbation) rule, our
analysis extends to such cases.
Recall update rule (2). For the purposes of our analysis, for each update we now need to know the
elapsed time since the previous update to the same coordinate, or since time 0 if it is the first update to that
coordinate; for the update at time τ , we denote this by ∆tτ . As explained in [20], in the Ongoing market
model, all the sellers need to know is the size of their warehouse stock at the times of the current update
and the previous update, which seem to be very natural information. We let αj(τ) denote the time of the
most recent update to pj strictly before time τ , or time 0 if there is no previous update to this price. We let
α(τ) denote the time of the most recent update to any price strictly before time τ , or time 0 if there is no
previous update to any price. And we let δτ := τ − α(τ), the elapsed time since the most recent previous
update to any price.
Suppose there is an update at time t. We let pkt denote the price updated at time t, we let p
t
kt
denote its updated value, and pt−kt its value right before this update; note that p
t−
kt
≡ pα(t)kt ≡ pt−δtkt . Let
∆ptkt := p
t
kt
− pt−kt . Also, we let z˜tkt denote the value of the excess demand used in the update to price pkt
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at time t. Finally, we let Γtkt := max{1, z˜tkt}/(λpt−kt ). Then update rule (2) can be rewritten in the following
form:
ptkt ← pt−kt +
1
Γtkt
· z˜tkt ·∆t. (3)
In our analysis, when we write
∑
τ∈I , where I is a time interval, the summation is summing over all
updates that occurred in time interval I.
Let ztk be the instantaneous excess demand for good k right before a price update at time t. We note
that ztk = −∇kφ(pα(t)). For each update τ , let zmax,τk and zmin,τk denote the maximum and minimum of
accurate excess demand values of good k in the time interval (αkτ (τ), τ).
We also need to define local Lipschitz parameters: L
[τa,τb]
jk is an upper bound on the Lipschitz gradi-
ent parameter Ljk of the function φ within a rectangular hull of those prices which might appear in the
time interval [τa, τb]. Observe that in update rule (2), since |min{z˜j , 1}| ≤ 1 always, the above-mentioned
rectangular hull is finitely bounded, and furthermore, it shrinks as λ gets smaller.
We use the following three lemmas. Lemma 1 is modified from a standard lemma in coordinate descent
to accommodate local Lipschitz gradient continuity. Lemma 2 is a direct consequence of the Power-Mean
inequality. Lemma 3 is a simple algebra exercise. See Appendix B for the missing proofs.
Lemma 1. Suppose there is an update to coordinate kt at time t according to rule (2), and suppose that
λ ≤ 1/10. Recall that z˜kt is the value used in applying rule (2). Then
φ(pα(t))− φ(pt) ≥ Γ
t
kt
4
· (∆p
t
kt
)2
∆t
− 1
Γtkt
· (ztkt − z˜kt)2 · |∆t|.
Lemma 2. Suppose that w1, w2, · · · , w` and y1, y2, · · · , y` are non-negative numbers. Then(∑`
j=1 wjyj
)2
≤
(∑`
j=1 wj
)(∑`
j=1 wj · (yj)2
)
.
Lemma 3. In Lemma 1, suppose that z˜′kt were used instead of z˜kt in update rule (3), but with Γ
t
kt
unchanged.
Let the new ∆pkt value be ∆
′ptkt . Then
Γtkt ·
(∆ptkt)
2
∆t
≥ Γ
t
kt
2
· (∆
′ptkt)
2
∆t
− 1
Γtkt
· (z˜kt − z˜′kt)2 ·∆t.
In the RHS of the inequality in Lemma 1, we call the first term,
Γtkt
4 ·
(∆ptkt )
2
∆t , a progress term, and we
call the second term, − 1
Γtkt
· (ztkt − z˜kt)2 · |∆t|, an error term. The progress term is cut into two halves. The
first half will be used to demonstrate progress of the convergence, while the second half will be saved to
compensate for the error terms in subsequent updates. Accordingly, we design a potential function Φ(t) of
the form Φ(t) := φ(pt) + A(t), where A(t) ≥ 0 for all t and A(0) = 0. We call A(t) the amortization bank ;
its purpose is to save portions of the progress terms for future compensations.
By showing that Φ(t) reduces by a constant fraction ε in every O(1) time units, we can deduce that
φ(pt) ≤ Φ(t) ≤ Φ(0) · (1− ε)Θ(t) = φ(p◦) · (1− ε)Θ(t), as desired.
We define the function A(t) as follows:
A(t) = c1
∑
τ∈(t−1,t]
∑
k 6=kτ
(1 + 1[E(k, τ, t)]) · L[τ,τ+1]kτ ,k ·
pτk
pτ−kτ
·
(
∆pτkτ
)2
∆tτ
,
where c1 > 0 is a constant we will determine later, and E(k, τ, t) denotes the event that price k is not
updated during the time interval (τ, t].
4 Analysis
Suppose there is an update at time t ≥ 2. We let ta denote the time of the latest update strictly before time
(t− 2), if any; otherwise, we let ta = 0. We let tb denote the time of the earliest update in the time interval
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[t− 1, t]. By Lemma 1,∑
τ∈(ta,t]
[Φ(α(τ))− Φ(τ)]
≥
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
[
Γτkτ
4
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
− 1
Γτkτ
(zτkτ − z˜τkτ )2 ·∆tτ
]
+ A(ta)−A(t)
(∗)
≥
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
[
Γτkτ
4
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
− 1
Γτkτ
(zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2 ·∆tτ
]
+ A(ta)−A(t). (4)
Inequality (∗) holds because in the tatonnement setting, both the accurate excess demand zτkτ and the
inaccurate excess demand z˜τkτ must lie between z
max,τ
kτ
and zmin,τkτ .
For any ν ∈ (αkτ (τ), τ), let ∆′pνkτ denote the ∆pkτ value if there were an update at time ν to price pkτ
using the accurate excess demand zνkτ . By Lemma 3, for each τ ∈ (ta, t],
Γτkτ
8
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
≥
∑
ν∈(max{ta,αkτ (τ)},τ ]
[
Γτkτ
16
· (∆
′pνkτ )
2
∆tτ
· δν
∆tτ
− 1
8Γτkτ
(zνkτ − z˜τkτ )2 · δν
]
≥ Γ
τ
kτ
16
 ∑
ν∈(max{ta,αkτ (τ)},τ ]
(∆′pνkτ )
2
(∆tτ )2
· δν
 − 1
8Γτkτ
· (zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2. (5)
For any k and any time ν, let βk(ν) denote the time of the earliest update to price k on or after time ν.
Combining (4) and (5) yields∑
τ∈(ta,t]
[Φ(α(τ))− Φ(τ)]
≥
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
∑
ν∈(max{ta,αkτ (τ)},τ ]
Γτkτ
16
· (∆
′pνkτ )
2
(∆tτ )2
· δν +
 ∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
+ A(ta)−A(t)

−
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
9
8Γτkτ
· (zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2
≥ 1
16
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν
n∑
k=1
Γ
βk(ν)
k · (∆′pνk)2
(∆tβk(ν))
2
−
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
9
8Γτkτ
· (zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2
+
 ∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
+ A(ta)−A(t)

≥ 1
16
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν
[
n∑
k=1
Γ
βk(ν)
k (∆
′pνk)
2
(∆tβk(ν))
2
+ c2 ·A(α(ν))
]
−
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
9
8Γτkτ
· (zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2
+
 ∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
+ A(ta) − A(t) − c2
16
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν ·A(α(ν))
 ,
for some small constant c2 > 0 we will determine later.
In [13], it was proved that the function φ is strongly convex in any region bounded away from zero
prices, and that the maximum Γ value throughout the tatonnement is upper bounded by a finite constant
which depends on the starting price p◦.3 We denote the finite upper bound on all Γ’s by Γ, and the strong
convexity parameter of φ by µφ, which also depends on the starting prices. We let ε := µφ/Γ. Then it is
a standard fact in optimization that
n∑
k=1
Γ
βk(ν)
k (∆
′pνk)
2
(∆tβk(ν))
2
=
n∑
k=1
1
Γ
βk(ν)
k
· (zνk)2 ≥
n∑
k=1
1
Γ
· (zνk)2 ≥ ε · φ(pα(ν)).
3Their argument concerned the synchronous setting, but it can be reused without change for the asynchronous setting.
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Setting ε′ = min{ε, c2}/16 yields∑
τ∈(ta,t]
[Φ(α(τ))− Φ(τ)]
≥ ε′
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν · Φ(α(ν)) −
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
9
8Γτkτ
· (zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2
+
 ∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
+ A(ta) − A(t) − c2
16
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν ·A(α(ν))
 . (6)
In the subsections below, we will prove that for a suitable choice of the Γ parameters and c1, c2, the final
two terms of (6), in sum, are non-negative. Also, we will show that Φ is decreasing over time. With these,
the above inequality implies that
Φ(ta)− Φ(t) =
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
[Φ(α(τ))− Φ(τ)] ≥ ε′
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν · Φ(α(ν)) ≥ ε′ · Φ(t),
and hence Φ(t) ≤ Φ(ta)/(1 + ε′). By iterating this (note that t > ta ≥ t− 3), we obtain
φ(pt) ≤ Φ(t) ≤ (1 + ε′)−(t/3−1) · Φ(0) = (1 + ε′)−(t/3−1) · φ(p◦),
thus demonstrating linear convergence.
4.1 Φ is a Decreasing Function
For any time τ at which there is an update, by Lemma 1 and the definition of A, we have
Φ(α(τ))− Φ(τ) ≥ Γ
τ
kτ
4
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
− 1
Γτkτ
(zτkτ − z˜τkτ )2 ·∆tτ + c1
∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[ν,ν+1]
kνkτ
· p
τ−
kτ
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
− 2c1
∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
·
(
∆pτkτ
)2
∆tτ
.
Next, (
zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2
≤
 ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[ν,τ ]
kν ,kτ
∣∣∆pνkν ∣∣
2
=
 ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
(
L
[ν,τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pν−kτ
)
·
(∣∣∆pνkν ∣∣
∆tν
· p
ν−
kτ
pν−kν
)2
≤
 ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[ν,τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pν−kτ
 ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[ν,τ ]
kν ,kτ
· p
ν−
kτ
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
 (by Lemma 2)
≤
 ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pτ−kτ
 ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,kτ
· p
τ−
kτ
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
 . (7)
Combining the above two equations and recalling that ∆tτ ≤ 1 yields
Φ(α(τ))− Φ(τ)
≥
Γτkτ
4
− 2c1
∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
 (∆pτkτ )2
∆tτ
+
c1 − 1
Γτkτ
∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pτ−kτ
 ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,kτ
· p
τ−
kτ
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
 . (8)
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Thus, for Φ to be decreasing, we impose the following conditions (the second one is stronger than what
is needed at this point):
Γτkτ ≥ 8c1
∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
and Γτkτ ≥
2
c1
∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pτ−kτ
. (9)
4.2 The Sum of the Last Two Terms in (6) is Non-negative
It remains to show that the sum of the last two terms in (6) is non-negative, i.e.,∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
− c2
16
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν ·A(α(ν)) + A(ta)−A(t) ≥
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
9
8Γτkτ
· (zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2. (10)
We first simplify the LHS using the definition of A:∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
− c2
16
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν ·A(α(ν)) + A(ta) − A(t)
≥
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
· (∆p
τ
kτ
)2
∆tτ
− c2
16
∑
ν∈(ta−1,tb]
4c1
∑
k 6=kν
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,k
· p
ν
k
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
+ c1
∑
ν∈(ta−1,ta]
∑
k 6=kν
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,k
· p
ν
k
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
− 2c1
∑
ν∈(t−1,t]
∑
k 6=kν
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,k
· p
ν
k
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
≥
(
c1 − c1c2
4
) ∑
ν∈(ta−1,ta]
∑
k 6=kν
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,k
· p
ν
k
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
+
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
−
(c1c2
4
+ 2c1
) ∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
 (∆pτkτ )2
∆tτ
.
By imposing the requirement that Γτkτ ≥ 8c3
∑
k 6=kτ L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· pτk
pτ−kτ
, for some constant c3 > 0 which we
will determine later, we obtain∑
τ∈(ta,t]
Γτkτ
8
(∆pτkτ )
2
∆tτ
− c2
16
∑
ν∈(ta,tb]
δν ·A(α(ν)) + A(ta) − A(t)
≥ min
{
c1 − c1c2
4
, c3 − c1c2
4
− 2c1
}
·
∑
τ∈(ta−1,t]
∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
(∆pτkτ )
2
∆tτ
.
On the other hand, by (7) and by the second condition imposed in (9),∑
τ∈(ta,t]
9
8Γτkτ
· (zmax,τkτ − z
min,τ
kτ
)2 ≤ 9c1
16
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,kτ
· p
τ−
kτ
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
=
9c1
16
∑
τ∈(ta,t]
∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,kτ
· p
ν
kτ
pν−kν
·
(
∆pνkν
)2
∆tν
≤ 9c1
16
∑
ν∈(ta−1,t]
∑
k 6=kν
L
[ν,ν+1]
kν ,k
· p
ν
k
pν−kν
(∆pνkν )
2
∆tν
.
By the above two inequalities, to satisfy (10), it suffices to have 9c116 ≤ min
{
c1 − c1c24 , c3 − c1c24 − 2c1
}
.
There are multiple possible choices for c1, c2, c3. We choose c3 = 21c1/8 and c2 = 1/4. To summarize, we
need the Γ parameters to satisfy
Γτkτ ≥ 21c1
∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
and Γτkτ ≥
2
c1
∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pτ−kτ
. (11)
Our remaining tasks are to derive upper bounds on the two summations in (11).
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4.3 Upper Bounds on the Local Lipschitz Parameters, and Determining the
Γ’s
Suppose in a Fisher market with buyers having CES utility functions, each buyer i has a budget of ei,
and her CES utility function has parameter ρi. For each i, let θi := ρi/(ρi − 1). As we have discussed in
Section 2, at any given price vector p ∈ Rn+, buyer i computes the demand-maximizing bundle of goods
costing at most ei; we let xi`(p) denote buyer i’s demand for good ` at price vector p.
In a Fisher market with buyers having complementary-CES utility functions, the following properties
are well-known. (See [14].)
1. For any k 6= j, ∣∣∣∣ ∂2φ∂pj ∂pk (p)
∣∣∣∣ = m∑
i=1
θi xij(p) xik(p)
ei
≤
m∑
i=1
xij(p) xik(p)
ei
.
2. Given positive price vector p, for any 0 < r1 < r2, let p
′ be prices such that for all `, r1p` ≤ p′` ≤ r2p`.
Then for all `, 1r2x`(p) ≤ x`(p′) ≤ 1r1x`(p).
Lemma 4. If the parameter λ in update rule (2) is at most 1/10, then
∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
≤ e4λ(λ+1) · xkτ (p
τ−)
pτ−kτ
and ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pτ−kτ
≤ 2e8λ(λ+1) · xkτ (p
τ−)
pτ−kτ
.
Proof: Let λ′ = 2λ(λ+ 1). Since λ ≤ 1/10, it is easy to observe that for any ν ∈ [τ, τ + 1] and for any k
(including coordinate kτ ),
e−λ
′ · pτ−k ≤ pνk ≤ eλ
′ · pτ−k , (12)
on noting that the ∆tν terms span up to 2 time units.
Accordingly, let P˜ :=
{
(p˜1, p˜2, · · · , p˜n)
∣∣∣ ∀k ∈ [n], e−λ′ · pτ−k ≤ p˜k ≤ eλ′ · pτ−k } . Then,∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
≤ 1
pτ−kτ
∑
k 6=kτ
(
max
p˜∈P˜
∣∣∣∣ ∂2φ∂pkτ ∂pk (p˜)
∣∣∣∣) · pτk
≤ 1
pτ−kτ
∑
k 6=kτ
m∑
i=1
(eλ
′
xikτ (p
τ−)) · (eλ′xik(pτ−))
ei
· pτ−k (by Properties 1 and 2) (13)
≤ e
2λ′
pτ−kτ
m∑
i=1
xikτ (p
τ−)
∑
k 6=kτ
xik(p
τ−) · pτ−k
ei
≤ e
2λ′
pτ−kτ
m∑
i=1
xikτ (p
τ−) (the second summation is at most 1, due to the budget constraint)
= e2λ
′ · xkτ (p
τ−)
pτ−kτ
. (14)
For the time range ν ∈ [αkτ (τ), τ ], inequality (12) also holds. Thus,
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∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pτ−kτ
≤ 1
pτ−kτ
∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν · e2λ′ · pτ−kν
≤ e
2λ′
pτ−kτ
∑
k 6=kτ
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
k,kτ
· pτ−k ·
∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
kν=k
∆tν
≤ 2e
2λ′
pτ−kτ
∑
k 6=kτ
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
k,kτ
· pτ−k . (observe that the
∑
ν
∆tν term above is at most 2)
The summation
∑
k 6=kτ L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
k,kτ
· pτ−k above can be bounded as in (14), yielding an upper bound of
e2λ
′ · xkτ (pτ−).
To conclude, by (11) and Lemma 4, it suffices to have:
1
λpτ−kτ
·max{1, z˜kτ } = Γτkτ ≥ max
{
21c1e
4λ(λ+1) ,
4
c1
· e8λ(λ+1)
}
· xkτ (p
τ−)
pτ−kτ
,
or equivalently,
λ ·max
{
21c1e
4λ(λ+1) ,
4
c1
· e8λ(λ+1)
}
≤ max{1, z˜kτ }
xkτ (p
τ−)
.
The minimum possible value of the RHS above is 1/(2e2λ(λ+1)). Thus, we need that
λ ·max
{
42c1e
6λ(λ+1) ,
8
c1
· e10λ(λ+1)
}
≤ 1.
We choose c1 such that the two parameters in the max are equal, i.e., c1 =
2√
21
· e2λ(λ+1). Then the above
inequality reduces to 4
√
21 · λ · e8λ(λ+1) ≤ 1; λ ≤ 1/25.5 suffices.
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A The Full Range of CES Utility Functions
To derive the upper bounds on the local Lipschitz parameters for substitute-CES utility functions, we only
need a few modifications from the complementary case. Recall that θi := ρi/(ρi − 1). Let ρ denote the
maximum ρi among all buyers i, and let
θ := max
{
ρ
1− ρ , 1
}
and E := max
{
1
1− ρ , 1
}
.
We note that when all ρi are negative, then θ = E = 1. The following facts are known (for Property 2,
see [20, 21]):
1. For any k 6= j, ∣∣∣∣ ∂2φ∂pj ∂pk (p)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
θi xij(p) xik(p)
ei
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ θ ·
m∑
i=1
xij(p) xik(p)
ei
.
2. Given positive price vector p, for any 1 ≤ r, let p′ be prices such that for all `, 1r · p` ≤ p′` ≤ r · p`.
Then for all `,
r−(2E−1) · x`(p) ≤ x`(p′) ≤ r2E−1 · x`(p).
Now we state the needed modifications in the proof of Lemma 4. First, both bounds will be multiplied
by the factor θ. Second, in (13), we replace the two eλ
′
by eλ
′(2E−1) in accord with the new Property 2.
Lemma 5. If the parameter λ in update rule (2) is at most 1/10, then∑
k 6=kτ
L
[τ,τ+1]
kτ ,k
· p
τ
k
pτ−kτ
≤ θe(8E−4)λ(λ+1) · xkτ (p
τ−)
pτ−kτ
and ∑
ν∈(αkτ (τ),τ)
L
[αkτ (τ),τ ]
kν ,kτ
·∆tν ·
pν−kν
pτ−kτ
≤ 2θe8Eλ(λ+1) · xkτ (p
τ−)
pτ−kτ
.
To summarize, we need λ ≤ 1/(10E), and
1
λpτ−kτ
·max{1, z˜kτ } = Γτkτ ≥ max
{
21c1θe
(8E−4)λ(λ+1) ,
4θ
c1
· e8Eλ(λ+1)
}
· xkτ (p
τ−)
pτ−kτ
,
or equivalently,
λθ ·max
{
21c1e
(8E−4)λ(λ+1) ,
4
c1
· e8Eλ(λ+1)
}
≤ 1
2e2λ(λ+1)
.
We pick c1 =
2√
21
· e2λ(λ+1), then we need 4√21 · λθ · e8Eλ(λ+1) ≤ 1. Observe that θ ≤ E always, so having
λ ≤ 1/(26E) suffices.
B Missing Proofs
First of all, we need the following definition. Let C be a convex set and F be a convex function. The local
Lipschitz gradient parameter Lj ≥ 0 within C satisfies: for all p ∈ C and r ∈ R such that p+ r · ej ∈ C,
|∇jF (p+ r · ej)−∇jF (p)| ≤ Lj · |r|.
As is well-known, this is equivalent to:
F (p+ r · ej) − F (p) − ∇jF (p) · r ≤ Lj
2
· r2.
We will prove a generalization of Lemma 1 which can be used to prove both Theorems 1 and 2.
We need the following lemma from [11, Lemma 10.15]4; a weaker version of this lemma which concerns
complementary-CES Fisher markets or substitute-CES Fisher markets can be found in [13].
4Lemma 6 is tailored to fit the scope of this paper. [11, Lemma 10.15] works for all nested-CES utility functions, and it
concerns some Bregman divergences which are not needed here. The inequality stated in Lemma 6 comes from the next to last
line of the proof of [11, Lemma 10.15].
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Lemma 6. In the Fisher market M described in Theorem 2, if for each j,
∣∣∣∆pjpj ∣∣∣ ≤ min {1/4 , 1/E}, then
φ(p+ ∆p)− φ(p) +
n∑
j=1
zj ·∆pj ≤
(
2
3
+
21E
25
) n∑
j=1
xj
pj
(∆pj)
2.
In other words, within the convex set in which the price of every good k 6= j is same as pk, and the price
of good j is within a factor (1± {1/4, 1/E}) of pj, the local Lipschitz gradient parameter Lj is at most(
4
3 +
42E
25
) · xjpj .
Next, we prove a generalization of Lemma 1, which works for all Fisher market M as described in
Theorem 2. The generalization is identical to Lemma 1, except for replacing the requirement λ ≤ 1/10 by
λ ≤ 1/(10E).
Proof of the generalization of Lemma 1 By having λ ≤ 1/(10E), we ensure that
Γtj =
max{1, z˜tj}
λpt−j
≥ e
−Eλ(λ+1)
2
xt−j ·
10E
pt−j
≥ 4Ex
t−
j
pt−j
,
which is greater than or equal to the local parameter Lj . Then by Lemma 6,
φ(pα(t))− φ(pt)
≥ ztj ·∆ptj −
Γtj
2
· (∆ptj)2
≥ z˜tj ·∆ptj − |ztj − z˜tj | · |∆ptj | −
Γtj
2
· (∆ptj)2
=
Γtj ·∆ptj
∆t
·∆ptj − |ztj − z˜tj | · |∆ptj | −
Γtj
2
· (∆ptj)2
(∗)
≥ Γ
t
j ·∆ptj
∆t
·∆ptj −
Γtj
2
· (∆ptj)2 −
1
2
(
2
Γtj
· (ztj − z˜tj)2 ·∆t +
Γtj
2
· (∆p
t
j)
2
∆t
)
≥ Γ
t
j
4
· (∆p
t
j)
2
∆t
− 1
Γtj
· (ztj − z˜tj)2 ·∆t (since ∆t ≤ 1);
the inequality (∗) holds due to the AM-GM inequality.
Proof of Lemma 3 By the elementary inequality b2 ≥ a2/2− (a− b)2 for all a, b ∈ R, we have
(∆ptj)
2 ≥ 1
2
· (∆′ptj)2 − (∆ptj −∆′ptj)2 =
1
2
· (∆′ptj)2 −
(∆t)2
(Γtj)
2
· (z˜j − z˜′j)2.
The lemma follows on multiplying both sides by Γtj/∆t.
C Leontief Fisher Markets
It is well-known that Leontief utility functions can be considered as the “limit” of CES utility functions as
ρ→ −∞. We recall that the two properties listed in Section 4.3 and Lemma 1 also hold for Leontief utility
functions. However, we cannot directly apply the analysis for the complementary CES case to the Leontief
Fisher markets for two reasons. First, while φ remains convex, it is no longer strongly convex, so µφ = 0.
Second, recall that Γτkτ ≥ Θ(1) ·
xkτ (p
τ−)
pτ−kτ
. For Leontief Fisher markets, it is possible that some good j
has zero equilibrium price. Under this scenario, for convergence to the equilibrium, Γtj has to grow towards
infinity, and hence Γ = +∞.
Here, we provide additional arguments which build on top of the result that Φ(t) decreases with t, to
show that tatonnement with update rule (2) still converges toward the market equilibrium. However, this
result does not provide a bound on the rate of convergence.
Tatonnement in Leontief Fisher markets was first analysed by Cheung, Cole and Devanur [13]. They gave
a bound on the convergence rate, but with a less natural update rule — in their update rule, Γtj increases
with the number of buyers in the market, and is also a function of the demands for all the goods, both of
which seem unnatural, while the Γtj used here is independent of the number of buyers and depends only on
the demand for good j.
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C.1 Analysis
Lemma 7. Let αj(t), t be the times at which two consecutive updates to pj occur. Let ∆t = t−αj(t). Then
Φ(αj(t))− Φ(t) ≥ Γ
t
j
8 ·
(∆ptj)
2
∆t .
Proof: First, we use the result in Section 4.1 to show that Φ(αj(t))− Φ(α(t)) ≥ 0.
Then we show that Φ(α(t))−Φ(t) ≥ Γ
t
j
8 ·
(∆ptj)
2
∆t . To do this, we follow the analysis in Section 4.1, except
that in (8), we now use the first condition in (11) to get the desired improved bound.
As shown in [13], there exists a finite positive number U which is an upper bound on all the prices
throughout the tatonnement process.
Lemma 8. Suppose that there are consecutive updates to pj at times τ0 < τ1 < · · · < τm, where τm−τ0 ≤ 2.
If
∣∣pτ0j − pτmj ∣∣ ≥ , where  ≤ 1, then Φ(τ0)− Φ(τm) ≥ 2 ·min{ 116 , 164λU }.
Proof: For q = 1, 2, · · · ,m, let ∆pj,q be the change made to pj by the update at time τq, and let z˜j,q be
the z˜-value used for the update, i.e., Γ
τq
j =
max{1,z˜j,q}
λ·pτ
−
q
j
and ∆pj,q = λ · pτ
−
q
j ·min{1, z˜j,q} ·∆tq.
If z˜j,q < 1, then
Γ
τq
j (∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
=
1
λ · pτ
−
q
j
(∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
≥ 1
λU
(∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
.
If z˜j,q ≥ 1, then
Γ
τq
j (∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
=
z˜j,q
λ · pτ
−
q
j
· λ2
(
p
τ−q
j
)2
·∆tq = λ · pτ
−
q
j z˜j,q ·∆tq ≥ |∆pj,q|.
By Lemma 7,
Φ(τ0)− Φ(τm) =
m∑
q=1
(Φ(τq−1)− Φ(τq)) ≥ 1
8
m∑
q=1
Γ
τq
j (∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
≥ 1
8λU
∑
q:z˜j,q<1
(∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
+
1
8
∑
q:z˜j,q≥1
|∆pj,q|.
By the assumption |pτ0j −pτmj | ≥ ,
∑m
q=1 |∆pj,q| ≥ . Let σ := −1
∑
q:z˜j,q≥1 |∆pj,q|. Then
∑
q:z˜j,q<1
|∆pj,q| ≥
max{0, (1− σ)}. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
[max{0, (1− σ)}]2 ≤
 ∑
q:z˜j,q<1
|∆pj,q|
2 =
 ∑
q:z˜j,q<1
∣∣∣∣∣ ∆pj,q√∆tq
∣∣∣∣∣ ·√∆tq
2
≤
 ∑
q:z˜j,q<1
(∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
 ∑
q:z˜j,q<1
∆tq

≤ 2
∑
q:z˜j,q<1
(∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
,
as τm − τ0 ≤ 2. Then
∑
q:z˜j,q<1
(∆pj,q)
2
∆tq
≥ 12 [max{0, (1− σ)}]2 and hence
Φ(τ0)− Φ(τm) ≥ 1
16λU
[max{0, (1− σ)}]2 + σ
8
.
By considering the following two cases: σ ≥ 1/2 or σ < 1/2, it is easy to show that the minimum value of
the RHS of the above inequality is at least 2 ·min{ 116 , 164λU }.
Corollary 9. For any  > 0, there exists a finite time T such that for any good j, any t ≥ T, and any
0 ≤ ∆t ≤ 1, |ptj − pt+∆tj | ≤ .
Proof: Suppose not, then by Lemma 8, Φ drops by at least 2 ·min{ 116 , 164λU } infinitely often. But Φ(0)
is finite and Φ remains positive throughout, a contradiction.
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Proof of Theorem 1 for the Leontief case: The proof comprises four steps. We need the following
definitions: for any two price vectors pA and pB , let d(pA,pB) denote the L1 norm distance between the
two price vectors, i.e., d(pA,pB) =
∑
j |pAj − pBj |. For any two sets of price vectors PA and PB , let
d(PA, PB) := inf
pA∈PA,pB∈PB
d(pA,pB).
Step 1. Let Ω be the set of limit points of a tatonnement process. We show that Ω is non-empty and
connected.
Since all prices remain bounded by U throughout the tatonnement process, Ω is non-empty.
Suppose Ω is not connected. Let Ωa denote a connected component of Ω that is well separated from
Ωb = Ω \ Ωa, i.e., d(Ωa,Ωb) = ′ > 0 (if there is no such Ωa then Ω is connected). By the definition of
limit points, there exists a finite time such that thereafter the prices in the tatonnement process are always
within an ′/4-neighborhood of either Ωa or Ωb. This forces an infinite number of updates, each separated
by at least one time unit, such that each update makes a change to a price by at least at least ′/(2n). This
contradicts Corollary 9.
Step 2. Recall that a market equilibrium is a price vector p∗ at which for each j, p∗j > 0 implies zj(p
∗) = 0
and p∗j = 0 implies zj(p
∗) ≤ 0. We define a pseudo-equilibrium: a price vector p˜ is a pseudo-equilibrium if
for each j, p˜j > 0 implies zj(p˜) = 0. Note that every market equilibrium is a pseudo-equilibrium. We show
that all limit points in Ω are pseudo-equilibria.
Suppose not. Let p′ ∈ Ω be a price vector which is not a pseudo-equilibrium, i.e., there exists j such
that p′j > 0 but zj(p
′) 6= 0. Let ′′ ≤ p′j |zj(p′)|/32 be a positive number such that for any price vector p`
in the ′′-neighborhood of p′, we must have p`j ≥ p′j/2 and zj(p`) lies between zj(p′)/2 and zj(p′).
By the definition of limit points, the tatonnement process enters the (′′/2)-neighborhood of p′ infinitely
often. By Corollary 9, there exists a finite time such that subsequently, every time the tatonnement process
enters the ′′/2-neighborhood of p′, it stays in the ′′-neighborhood of p′ for at least three time units. Within
the first two time units, pj is updated at least once, and by update rule (2), such updates will make a total
change to pj of at least λ(p
′
j/2)(|zj(p′)| /2) ≥ 8′′, which forces quitting the ′′-neighborhood of p′ strictly
before the three time unit interval, a contradiction.
Step 3. We show that the excess demands at all limit points in Ω are identical.
For every subset of goods S, let ΩS = {p′ ∈ Ω | p′k > 0⇔ k ∈ S}. For each buyer, there are two cases:
• the buyer wants at least one good in S, say good `:
Observe that by the definition of pseudo-equilibrium and Step 2, every price vector in ΩS , excluding
the zero prices in the price vector, is a market equilibrium for the sub-Leontief-market comprising
the goods in S. Codenotti and Varadarajan [19] pointed out that the demands for the goods in S of
each buyer are identical at every market equilibrium of the sub-Leontief market, and hence also in
the original Leontief market. So the buyer demands the same positive but finite amount of good ` at
every price vector in ΩS in the original market. Also note that the buyer always demands the goods
in the original market in a fixed proportion. This forces the demands for the goods not in S of the
buyer to also be identical at every price vector in ΩS .
• the buyer wants no good in S:
Then the buyer demands an infinite amount of each good that she wants, and demands zero amount
of each good that she does not want.
In either case, the buyer’s demands for each good at every price vector in ΩS are identical, and hence also
the total demand for each good.
Then consider a graph G with each vertex corresponding to a subset of goods S such that ΩS is non-
empty, and two vertices S1, S2 are adjacent if and only if d (ΩS1 ,ΩS2) = 0. Since excess demands are a
continuous function5 of prices, if S1 and S2 are adjacent, then the excess demands for all goods at every
price vector in S1 ∪ S2 are identical. By Step 1, the graph G is connected, thus the excess demands at all
limit points in Ω are identical.
Step 4. We show that every limit point in Ω is indeed a market equilibrium.
5The range of the excess demand functions is the extended real line R∪ {+∞}; continuity of the excess demand function is
w.r.t. the usual topology on the extended real line. To be specific, if zk(p) = +∞ for some p and k, then for any M ∈ R, there
exists an M > 0 such that zk(p) ≥M in the M -neighborhood of p.
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Suppose not, i.e., there exists a limit point p′ in Ω which is a pseudo-equilibrium but not a market
equilibrium, i.e., there exists k such that p′k = 0 but zk(p
′) > 0. By Step 3, zk is positive at every limit
point in Ω, and hence every pk at every limit point must be zero. By the definition of limit points, for any
 > 0, beyond a finite time, the tatonnement process must stay within the -neighborhood of Ω thereafter.
By choosing a sufficiently small , zk is bounded away from zero in the -neighborhood of Ω, and hence
pk increases indefinitely and eventually pk becomes so large that the tatonnement process must leave the
-neighborhood of Ω, a contradiction.
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